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ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT IN DELAWARE
The status of the law of arrest has for some time been the object of
sharp criticism by those both within and without the field of law enforce-
ment. Police officers constantly bemoan the fact that the efficiency of their
work is curtailed by the restrictive nature of the modern rules of arrest,
and only the most optimistic and naive could contend that these rules are
not sometimes violated for that very reason.' Criticism voiced by those out-
side the field of law enforcement centers on the flagrant and repeated dis-
regard of constitutional rights
2
The purpose of this Note is to examine certain aspects of the law of
arrest in Delaware and to note some of the problems which arise in this
area. Special emphasis will be placed on the elements necessary to constitute
a lawful arrest, the role of the constable, special constable, and other police
officers in arresting and detaining parties under Delaware law, and the pos-
sible effects and consequences of an unlawful arrest. The common law of
arrest will be compared with the changes brought about by legislation and
the anticipated effect of recent federal decisions on state law will be
considered.
ELEMENTS OF A LAWFUL ARREST AND DETENTION
It has been stated that four elements are necessary to constitute an
arrest: (1) a purpose to take the person to be arrested into the custody of
the law; (2) under a real or pretended authority; and (3) an actual or
constructive seizure or detention of his person; (4) so understood by the
person arrested.3 Under the Uniform Arrest Act,4 which has been the basic
statutory provision governing arrest in the State of Delaware since 1951,5
1. Ploscowe, A Modern Law of Arrest, 39 MINN. L. REv. 473 (1955). The author
points out, for example, that the law does not permit police officers to arrest for the
purpose of making an investigation to determine whether the individual arrested is in-
volved in a crime; yet, the "arrest on suspicion," for purposes of investigation, is a
common practice.
2. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Inditidual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REv. 493 (1955).
3. State ex" rel. Sadler v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 70 Mont. 378,
225 Pac. 1000 (1924).
4. DEL. 'CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1901-12 (1953). (Originally drafted by the Interstate
Commission on Crime.)
5. Prior to the adoption of the act in 'Delaware, Rhode Island and New Hampshire
had adopted the act substantially without change at the request of their attorneys general.
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"arrest" is defined as "the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be forthcoming to answer for the commission of a crime."6 Although
the definition seems uncomplicated, difficulty sometimes arises in determin-
ing whether an arrest has in fact been made under the circumstances of a
particular case. This determination must be made before the legality of the
arrest is considered.
Some of the earlier Delaware cases speak of arrest as "the laying of
hands on the defendant."' 7 Although this physical touching appears to have
been a requirement at one time in England,8 it is seldom mentioned in the
more recent state decisions. Perhaps the most comprehensive statement of
what is required is to be found in State v. Gulczynski,9 where the court noted:
It has been held by this court in some cases that to constitute an
arrest, the officer shall place, his hand on the accused or otherwise
take possession of his person. But even if this is not necessary,
certainly the officer must do or say something from which the
accused can reasonably believe that he is under arrest. He must have
reasonable ground to believe that- he cannot go away, that he is
restrained of his liberty.' 0
Thus, while a laying of hands on the arrestee may be unnecessary for the
consummation of an arrest, the restraint imposed must be unequivocally
manifested in some way. The quotation above suggests that in actuality the
intentions, understandings, and conduct of the parties will often be deter-
minative of whether an arrest has in fact been made.
To what extent must the arresting officer identify himself and state his
purpose? In Delaware it has been held from an early date that it is not
necessary for one known to be a public officer to state his authority before
niaking an arrest." Nor is the arresting officer obliged to make a formal
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1901 (1953).
7. State v. Townsend, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 487 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1854). In State v.
Mahon, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 568 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1843), the court stated: "A person having
authority to arrest another must do so peaceably and with as little violence as the case
will admit of. He must touch the person and ought to do it without violence, unless the
case requires roughness." Id. at 569.
Another statement of the rule is found in Lawson v. Buzines, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 416
(Super. Ct. 1842): "To constitute a legal arrest the officer must lay his hands on the
defendant, or otherwise take possession of his person. He must make him his prisoner in
an unequivocal form." Id. at 418.
8. Genner v. Sparks, 1 Salk 79, 91 Eng. Rep. 74 (C.P. 1704), where it was said:
Bare words will not make an arrest; but if the bailiff had touched him, that had
been an arrest. . . . If [the party to be arrested] submits, turns back, or goes
with him, though the bailiff never touched him, yet it is an arrest, because he
submitted to the process; but if, instead of going with the bailiff, he had gone or
fled from him, it could be no arrest, unless the bailiff laid hold of him.
Id. at 74-75.
9. 32 Del. (2 W. W. Harr.) 120, 120 Atl. 88 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922).
10. Id. at 123, 120 Atl. at 89.
11. State v. Krakus, 28 Del. (5 Boyce) 326, 93 Atl. 554 (Ct. 0. & T. 1915) ; State
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declaration to the person being taken into custody that he is being arrested.' 2
However, the validity of these rules may be challenged by recent decisions
in the United States Supreme Court.' 3 In the exercise of its supervisory
authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts
the Supreme Court may formulate rules of evidence to be applied in federal
prosecutions. 14 However, as is evident from Mapp v. Ohio,'5 certain basic
constitutional standards for arrests and seizures are embodied in the fourth
amendment, and are made binding upon the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 16 Mapp settled the question as to admissibility of evidence ob-
tained as a result of an illegal search, but there are many other areas left
in doubt. Of course, the states are always free to impose standards more
stringent than those used in the federal courts ;17 the problems arise where
the state requirements are less restrictive. On the requirement of notice of
purpose and authority the Supreme Court, in Miller v. United States,'
8
said that the lawfulness of the entry to arrest "must be tested by criteria
identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which deals with entry to
execute a search warrant."1 9 Under that statute the officer must state his
authority and purpose and may not enter by force until he has been denied
v. Townsend, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 487 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1854). This has also been held to be
the rule in the federal courts. See, e.g., Suhay v. United States, 95 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.
1938).
12. State v. Klinehoffer, 53 Del. (3 Storey) 550, 173 A.2d 478 (1961).
13. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); cf. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392
(1963) ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
14. E.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); see Note, The Super-
visory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656, 1660-64 (1963).
15. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), noted in 77 HARV. L. REi. 113 (1963).
The Court announced unequivocally that fourth amendment standards are binding on the
states.
17. Nearly all states, for example, have adopted rather strict standards for the
arrest of minors. Incarceration of minors is closely regulated by statute in Delaware.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 977(a) (1953) which provides that no minor shall be
"incarcerated" in any jail or police station. In a recent case, State v. Harrison, Crim.
No. 713, Del. Super. Ct., July 3, 1963, three youths suspected of rape were picked up
at their homes and taken to the police station for questioning. The room in which they
were interrogated had no bars on the windows. Under these conditions the youths made
statements regarding their alleged involvement in the crime. At the trial of two of the
defendants it was contended that the statements were obtained while the youths were
"incarcerated" and that they were therefore inadmissible as evidence against them. The
court construed "incarceration" very broadly, found that the youths were confined when
they made the statements, and refused to admit the statements into evidence. New Jersey,
however, in a similar case under a similar statute, arrived at a different conclusion.
State v. Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 161 A.2d 520 (1960). The New Jersey court said the statute
clearly envisioned only those situations where confinement is necessary pending a
hearing and disposition in juvenile court or where commitment is ordered after a hearing
and does not apply where presence in the police station is only for a temporary purpose
such as investigation or interrogation.
18. 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
19. Id. at 306.
[Vol. 68
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admission. It has been strongly suggested that the Miller case has a consti-
tutional basis under the fourth amendment and that it is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth.2 0 While this interpretation might seem
reasonable in light of the discussion of Miller in Wong Sun v. United
States,21 it seems less likely in light of Ker v. California,22 a state prosecution
for possession of marijuana. In that case the officers entered defendant's
apartment by use of a passkey without any prior announcement of their
presence. To determine the validity of the arrest the Court looked to the
law of California which recognized a judicial exception to the statutory
notice requirement 23 under exigent circumstances 24 and applied this excep-
tion in the case.25 The Court pointed out that in Wong Sun no such circum-
stances were alleged by the government. Had the Court desired to give Miller
a constitutional basis it would seem that the appropriate time to do so was
in Ker. At any rate, the rulings of Miller and Wong Sun on this point extend
only to cases where entry into a dwelling is necessary to make the arrest,
and even if applicable to the states, may leave the Delaware rule undisturbed
as it applies to other situations. Moreover, the Delaware cases involve persons
known to be public officers; the use of the word "known" suggests that where
one is not known to be a public officer a statement of purpose and identity
may be required.
Another element sometimes requiring examination by the courts is the
degree of force used by the police officer in making the arrest. The Uni-
form Arrest Act provides that no unreasonable force or means of restraint
may be used in detaining or arresting any person; yet the arresting officer
need not desist in the face of resistance by the person being arrested.26
Where the arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a felony, he is justified in using such force as
may be necessary to make the arrest, prevent an escape, or overcome
20. Broeder, Wong Sun-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REV. 483, 505-06
(1963).
21. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
22. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). While the states are free to formulate their own rules as
to arrest and search, these rules, including the requirement of notice of purpose and
authority, must comply with the standards of reasonableness under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. That these standards are the same under both amendments is an
essential part of the holding of the case.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 844. This statute permits forcible entry after the officer
has demanded admittance and explained his purpose.
24. See, e.g., People v. Ruiz, 146 Cal. App. 2d 630, 304 P.2d 175 (1956) ; People v.
Maddox, 146 Cal. App. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956). The question was whether this
judicially engrafted exception violated the fourth amendment.
25. The Justices seemed to agree that an exception exists in a case of fresh pursuit
where there is reasonable belief that a party inside is in danger of immediate bodily harm.
Disagreement was over the case where such announcement of presence might afford an
opportunity to destroy evidence. 374 U.S. at 38-41, 54-58, 61-62.
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 190 4 (a) (1953).
1964]
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resistance, provided there is apparently no other possible means of making
the arrest and he has made every reasonable effort to advise the person that
he is being arrested.2 7 These provisions, except perhaps for the last one,
added little to the law of the state as it already existed on these matters, and
early Delaware case law is in accord with them.
28
A lawful arrest may be vitiated after the defendant is taken into custody.
At common law the arrested party had to be taken before a magistrate
without unreasonable delay.29 The Uniform Arrest Act preserves this rule
and in addition provides that where possible the arrested party shall be
brought before a magistrate within twenty-four hours after his arrest.8 0
There is, however, the exception that where good cause is shown, a judge
may order the arrested party to be held for a period not to exceed an addi-
tional forty-eight hours.3' The exception is perhaps open to the charge that
it violates the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits deprivation of liberty
without due process of law, but no reported case has been found where the
constitutionality of the provision has been tested. Indeed, under recent
federal decisions, the rule itself, as well as the exception, may be open to
constitutional attack. Federal procedural rules provide that a person arrested
without warrant shall be taken before the nearest available commissioner
without unnecessary delay.32 In Mallory v. United States"3 the Supreme
Court outlawed any delay made solely for the purpose of investigation. The
court interpreted Rule 5(a) as allowing "little more leeway than the interval
between arrest and the ordinary administrative steps required to bring a
suspect before the nearest available magistrate."3 4 "Without unnecessary
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1904(c) (1953).
28. In State v. Mills, 22 Del. (6 Penne.) 497, 69 Atd. 841 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1908)
the court set this standard:
A peace officer may use whatever force is reasonably necessary to prevent the
escape and secure the arrest of any person he may find engaged in a breach of
the peace or any criminal offense, or manifestly about to engage in such offense;
but he must use no more force and violence than is reasonably necessary to
secure the arrest and to convey him to a place of custody.
Id. at 500, 69 Atl. at 842. Accord, Petit v. 'Colmary, 20 Del. (4 Penne.) 266, 55 Ati. 344
(Super. Ct. 1903).
29. 1 BisuoP', NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 214(1), 216 (2d ed. 1913).
30. DEL. COnE ANN. tit. l1, § 1911 (1953). To the same effect see DEL. SUPER. CT.
(CRIM) R. 5(a). In Garner v. State, 51 Del. (1 Storey) 301, 145 A.2d 68 (1958)
and Thompson v. State, - Del. -, 194 A.2d 141 (1961), the court held that the
rule contemplates an arrest and does not apply to a case in which the defendant is already
in custody.
31. DEL. Con ANN. tit. 11, § 1911 (1953).
32. FED. R. CRIM P. 5(a) provides as follows:
An officer making an arrest under warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner . ...
33. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
34. Id. at 453. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 704 (1953) also requires that an arrestee
be brought before the nearest available magistrate if arrested for a traffic violation outside
[Vol. 68
19641 NOTE
delay" was interpreted to mean "as quickly as possible." Again it has been
suggested that this federal rule rests on a constitutional basis and through
the fourteenth amendment is extended to the state as well as to the federal
courts.3 5 Should this prove to be the proper interpretation it may well be
that the applicable provision of the Uniform Arrest Act will be found un-
constitutional-that twenty-four hours will be found to be an unreasonable
time lapse between arrest and arraignment before a magistrate.
Under Delaware law an arrest is distinguished from a detention. The
Uniform Arrest Act, in one of its most important and perhaps one of its
most litigated provisions, authorizes the detention of a party for two hours
for purposes of ascertaining his name, address, business abroad, and where
he was going. 36 Such action may be taken where the officer has reasonable
ground to suspect that the person is committing, has committed, or is about
to commit a crime.3 7 At the expiration of the two hour period the detained
party must be either released or arrested and charged with a crime.38 It has
been held that there is no justification for holding a party longer than two
hours without making an arrest.3 9 It is specifically provided that such deten-
tion is not an arrest and is not to be recorded as an arrest in any official
record. 40 Difficulty often arises where it becomes necessary for the court
to determine whether the defendant has been arrested or merely detained
Wilmington; however, in the recent case of Nelte v. State, - Del. -, 198 A.2d 921
(1964), the supreme court held that the statute gives a defense which can be waived
by failure to assert it and that the requirement does not go to the jurisdiction of the justice
of the peace.
35. Broeder, Wong Sun-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 569
(1963).
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902(a) (1953). There is some early judicial recogni-
tion of a right of peace officers to stop and investigate suspicious persons. In addition
there are some modern cases where the courts seem to have recognized a distinction
between detaining for questioning and making an arrest, approving the former procedure
where the latter would not be tolerated under the same facts. However, these decisions
are insufficient to establish an American common-law right to detain suspects. For
collected cases and discussion of the matter, see generally Warner, The Uniform Arrest
Act, 28 U. VA. LAw REV. 315 (1942). The Delaware Supreme Court in DeSalvatore v.
State, 52 Del. (2 Storey) 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960), and again in Cannon v. State,
53 Del. (3 Storey) 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961), specifically upheld the constitutionality of
the detention provision of the Uniform Arrest Act, saying that it is clearly a reasonable
exercise of the police power. In Cannon the court noted that such detention has long
been a police practice, but perhaps of doubtful validity in many cases of misdemeanor.
The court also said that the statute contemplated the use of whatever force is necessary
to effect the detention. The Rhode Island court, in Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, - R.I.
-, 174 A.2d 560 (1961), specifically followed the two Delaware cases and upheld the
constitutionality of the provision. The court said that, even assuming there is no distinc-
tion between detention and arrest at common law, the legislature in the exercise of its
broad police power can provide for such a distinction in reasonable circumstances.
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902(a) (1953).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902(c) (1953).
39. State v. De Koenigswarter, - Del. -, 177 A.2d 344 (Super. Ct. 1962).
40. DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902(c) (1953).
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unlawfully, as where he is kept in custody for a period exceeding the two
hours permitted. The cases seem to indicate that the Delaware courts are
rather liberal in finding a lawful arrest where without such finding the
defendant would have the defense of unlawful detention. 41 The constitu-
tionality of the detention statute may be challenged under the fourth amend-
ment. There is no similar provision in the federal law.
The detention provision specifically authorizes the peace officer to
"stop any person abroad .... The word "abroad" does not appear to have
been specifically defined. Perhaps the most liberal treatment accorded the term
thus far is in State v. Halko.43 In that case the driver of a motor vehicle
reported to police that another driver, apparently intoxicated, had collided
with his car. In the early morning the police found the defendant in his car,
unconscious, with the lights on. The car was in front of his business premises.
The court found that to hold defendant was not "abroad" within the mean-
ing of the statute would be to emasculate it.
PARTIES AUTHORIZED To ARREST AND DETAIN
A basic requisite of a lawful arrest or detention is that the party mak-
ing the arrest or detention must have the authority to do so. The powers
of arrest and detention under the Uniform Arrest Act are given to all
peace officers. "Peace officer" is defined as any public officer authorized by
law to make arrests in a criminal case."'44 Such police officers as the state
police, state detectives, county police, constables and sheriffs are undoubtedly
included in this category. The state police have powers similar to those of
sheriffs, constables, and other police officers and are charged with conserving
the peace throughout the state, suppressing all acts of violence, and enforcing
all laws relating to the safety of persons and property. 45 State detectives
41. In Wilson v. State, 49 Del. (10 Terry) 37, 109 A.2d 381 (1954), defendant
contended on appeal that he was not arrested when taken into custody and that therefore
his detention after two hours was unlawful. (Defendant had been picked up on the street
and taken directly to the police station, apparently without questioning.) The trial record
related numerous instances where the officer's action was characterized as an "arrest"
by the judge, prosecuting officers, and defendant's counsel. The court concluded simply
that "enough appears to make it reasonably clear that Wilson was arrested." In State
v. Klinehoffer, 53 Del. (3 Storey) 550, 173 A.2d 478 (1961) defendant also was seeking
to claim unlawful detention. The court said that the facts were governed by the Wilson
case:
There is nothing before me which in the slightest degree indicates that defendant
was "detained," i.e., was taken into custody for the purpose of ascertaining his
name, address, business abroad and where he was going. The record is clear that
he was taken to the Elsmere Police Station and that constituted an arrest.
Id. at 554-555, 173 A.2d at 480.
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902(a) (1953).
43. - Del. -, 175 A.2d 42 (1962).
44. Dms. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1901 (1953).
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8302 (1953).
[Vol. 68
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also are authorized to make arrests and serve writs anywhere in the state.46
In New Castle County the county police are vested with the powers of con-
stables. It is provided that they shall "see that the peace and good order of
the state ... be duly kept . . . , arrest all persons who shall in their . ..
presence commit any riot, affray or other breach of peace, or who shall be
riotously assembled . . . and shall use diligence in arresting murderers,
thieves, and other felons . . .47
Constables
Constables, like sheriffs, are ministerial officers of the law, and the scope
of their particular powers is now regulated by statute in most states.48 In
Delaware the constable was early recognized as a peace officer with power
to arrest even without warrant one committing a breach of the peace or other
crime, or when he had reasonable ground to suspect the person of such
offense.49 In addition to executing lawful warrants the constable is charged
with arresting and taking before a justice of the peace any person who com-
mits any breach of the peace in his presence. 50 He is bound to use diligence in
arresting felons and if necessary may command the aid of any of the people
of the state.5 ' The jurisdiction of each constable extends throughout the
county of his appointment 52 The provisions set forth in the statute are
basically a codification of the common law powers of constables.
Delaware Memorial Bridge Police
Despite rather complete coverage by the legislature, the courts too have
played an active role in determining who has the power of arrest and deten-
tion, that is, who is a peace officer under the Uniform Arrest Act. In DeSal-
vatore v. State,55 for example, the state supreme court considered the extent
of the powers of constables and Delaware Memorial Bridge Police under the
Uniform Arrest Act and whether or not such parties come within the class
described as "other peace officers" in the statute authorizing certain officers
to make arrests for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.5 4 In this case two
bridge guards, known generally as bridge police, observed defendant's car
46. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8703(c) (1953).
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 1903(c) (1953).
48. 47 AM. JUR. Sheriffs, Police, and Constables § 34 (1943).
49. State v. Brown, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 505 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1854).
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2723(a) (4) (1953). There may be some question
as to whether this provision is consistent with the authority given peace officers under
the Uniform Arrest Act to arrest where they have reasonable ground to believe that a
misdemeanor has been committed in their presence.
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2723(b) (1953).
52. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2721 (1953).
53. 52 Del. (2 Storey) 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960).
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1953).
1964]
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crossing the grass dividing strip of a dual highway at a point some distance
from the bridge where there was no legal crossover. They stopped defendant,
who admitted having had some beer to drink, and informed him that he
was being placed under a two-hour detention for purposes of a sobriety test
after which he would either be released or charged with a crime. Appellant
submitted, went with the officers to the police station where the tests were
administered, and was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
On appeal defendant argued that bridge police have only the powers of
arrest of constables,55 that is, to arrest only for a breach of the peace committed
in their presence, and that since the statute authorizing certain officers to
make arrests for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code5" was amended to
omit constables from the listed officers having such powers, the bridge police
have no authority to arrest for traffic violations. The statute in question lists
certain officers authorized to make such arrests and included in the list in
which neither constables nor bridge policemen are specifically mentioned is
a class described as "other peace officers." The court said appellant's argu-
ment was technical and that its validity was to be doubted because "the very
nature of their employment requires the Bridge Police to enforce the traffic
laws on the bridge, and we think they might well fit within the class described
as . . . 'other peace officers.' "57 The court, however, refused to base a deci-
sion on this ground, saying that there was another and complete answer to
the argument-that since bridge police have the power to make arrests in a
criminal case, they are peace officers within the meaning of the Uniform
Arrest Act which authorizes such officers to detain for two hours any person
reasonably suspected of having committed a crime. Constables, and thus
bridge police, are peace officers within the meaning of the act.
In reply to appellant's contention that the jurisdiction of bridge police
is confined to the bridge proper and that the arrest took place some distance
away, the court observed that the section authorizing detention58 is silent
as to territorial limitations, the jurisdiction of constables extends by statute
throughout the county of their appointment,59 and that therefore the bridge
police, as peace officers, are authorized to make arrests and detain suspects
at least within the confines of New Castle County. The court held that con-
stables are peace officers under the Uniform Arrest Act authorizing a peace
officer to detain for investigation any person reasonably suspected of having
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 411(b) (1953) provides that such guards shall have
the powers of a constable in the performance of their duties.
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1953).
57. 52 Del. (2 Storey) 550, -,163 A.2d 244, 248 (1960).
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902 (1953).
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2721 (1953).
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committed a crime, and that bridge police, coming under the same category
as constables so far as their powers are concerned, have the same authority
under the act.
Special Constables
In addition to the regular county constables, most of whom are appointed
by the levy court6" for a period of two years,61 with the remaining ones ap-
pointed by the governor for terms of four years, 62 the governor is specifically
authorized to appoint special constables for the Delaware State Hospital,63
the St. Joseph's Industrial School, 64 and for any railroad company in the state
which may apply.6 5 In a blanket provision the governor is authorized, upon
the application of any individual, firm or corporation carrying on business in
the state, to appoint such person or persons as may be recommended or desig-
nated by such party, to act as special constable for the preservation of peace
and good order in and about the premises occupied by them.66 These special
constables are to have the powers of a county constable except that they have
no power or authority to serve any writ or process in any civil action or pro-
ceeding.67 Although the question has not been specifically decided by the
courts, it would appear that special constables are "peace officers" within the
meaning of the Uniform Arrest Act.
Private Citizens
The power of private citizens to arrest remains to be considered. There
is no statute in Delaware imposing upon private persons the duty or grant-
ing to them the authority to make arrests. The common law extended to
private citizens the power to arrest without warrant for felonies and breaches
of the peace committed in their presence, and to arrest on probable cause
for past felonies if they had actually been committed.68 At common law the
basic difference between the power of peace officers to arrest without warrant
and that of private citizens appears to be that the former could justify a
probable cause arrest in a felony case where a felony had not actually been
committed, while the latter could not.69
In other states the right of private citizens to arrest without warrant
60. The levy court in Delaware is not a judicial body but a county commission
composed of elected commissioners.
61. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2710 (1953).
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 2702, 2705 (1953).
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2713 (1953).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2714 (1953).
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2715 (1953).
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2716(a) (1953).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2716(c) (1953).
68. See generally 5 Am. JUR. 2d Arrest §§ 34-35 (1962) and cases cited therein.
69. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 752 (2d Cir. 1950) (dictum).
1964]
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is regulated to a considerable extent by legislation, 70 and in at least one
jurisdiction the entire subject is covered by statute.71 Some of these juris-
dictions authorize a private person to arrest for any misdemeanor com-
mitted in his presence, but under the common law such an arrest can be
made only for a misdemeanor constituting a breach of the peace.7 2 Also
under the common law it was considered to be the duty of a private person
to arrest for a felony and to use such force as was reasonably necessary to
make the arrest. 73 In Delaware, where the common law is in force except as
modified by statute,7 4 and where the statutes make no provision on the sub-
ject, a private citizen's common law power to arrest without warrant may
be presumed to be in effect. There are no cases in Delaware precisely on
this point, but there is authority from the office of the attorney general75
and perhaps even language in the statutes 76 which indicate that should the
question arise the courts would follow the general rule.
ARRESTS BY PEACE OFFICERS FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS
Misdemeanors
Where the arrest is being executed by a peace officer without a warrant
and the crime involved is a misdemeanor only, the Uniform Arrest Act makes
70. See Suell v. Derricott, 161 Ala. 259, 49 So. 895 (1909) ; Graham v. State, 143
Ga. 440, 85 S.E. 328 (1915).
71. McCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 94 S.W. 79 (1906).
72. See Petersojn v. Robinson, 43 Cal. App. 2d 690, 277 P.2d 19 (1954) ; People v.
Clark, 9 Ill. App. 2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956); State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83
S.E.2d 100 (1956).
73. Viliborghi v. State, 45 Ariz. 275, 43 P.2d 210 (1935) ; People v. Lillard, 123
Pac. 221 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912); State v. Rutherford, 8 N.C. 247 (1821); Brooks
v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45
A.2d 235 (1946) ; 5 Am. JUR. 2d Arrest §§ 84-85 (1962) ; 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 13 (1937)
WHARTON, HOMICIDE § 489 (3d ed. 1907).
74. DEL. CONST. art. 25 (1776) (now DEL. CONST. Schedule, § 18, (1897)). The
common law of England is part of the law of the State of Delaware except where it is
inconsistent with the state statutory law. Steele v. State, 52 Del. (2 Storey) 5, 151 A.2d
127 (1959) ; DiStefano v. Lamborn, 46 Del. (7 Terry) 195, 81 A.2d 675 (Super. Ct.
1951).
75. See Report from the Office of the Attorney General of Delaware, "Re: Death
of Louis Berry," August 15, 1963. In State v. Dugan, 1 Houst. Crim. Rept. 563 (Ct. 0. &
T. 1879), the court stated; "Justifiable homicide is where ... a private person or officer
attempts to arrest a man charged with felony, is resisted and in the endeavor to take
him, kills him .... " Id. at 571-72. (Emphasis added.)
One example of arrest by a private person recognized in Delaware is in the case of
a bondsman who has the power to pursue his absconding principal into another state,
to apprehend him forcibly, and to return him without resort to legal process. Admittedly,
this is a special case. The court said that such arrest is not action by the state and that
therefore no extradition is required. Golla v. State, 50 Del. (11 Terry) 497, 135 A.2d
137 (1957). For a more thorough discussion of this power of a bondsman, see Note,
Extra-Jurisdictional Power of Bail, 66 DICK. L. REV. 101 (1962).
76. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 621 (1953) charges with a felony "whoever" makes
an arrest and fails to follow the specified procedure, possibly indicating that private
citizens as well as public officers may arrest where those conditions are satisfied.
NOTE
such arrest legal when the arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor in his presence.
77
By adoption of the act Delaware appears to have taken a middle-ground posi-
tion on arrest without warrant for misdemeanors. The common law rule was
that such an arrest is legal where the misdemeanor is committed in the
presence or view of the arresting officer. 78 Then, in Rickards v. State,79 the
Delaware supreme court, in its interpretation of an 1863 statute,80 stated
that such an arrest is legal where there was probable cause to believe that
the party arrested had recently committed a misdemeanor and that without
such arrest he would escape justice. The above two views may be said to
represent the extremes. Between them lies the present position which in
the express words of the Uniform Arrest Act is that such arrest is legal
"whenever he [the arresting officer] has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor in his presence." 8'
He must have more than reasonable ground to believe the offense has been
committed; he must have reasonable ground to believe it was committed in
his presence; yet apparently the offense need not in fact have been com-
mitted in his presence.8 2 The court has said that "in his presence" is not to
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1906(a)(1) (1953).
78. See State v. Gulczynski, 32 Del. (2 W. W. Harr.) 120, 120 AtI. 88 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1922) ; State v. Krakus, 28 Del. (5 Boyce) 326, 93 Atl. 554 (Ct. 0. & T. 1915)
State v. Mills, 22 Del. (6 Penne.) 497, 69 Atl. 841 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1908).
79. 45 Del. (6 Terry) 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950).
80. 18 Del. Laws, ch. 691. This provision later became Del. Rev. Code § 5173 (1935)
and is presently DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 621 (1953). In Rickards the word "crime" as
used in the 1863 statute authorizing the arrest of a person without warrant where "there
is probable cause to believe he has recently committed a crime," was interpreted to
include both felonies and misdemeanors. Thus, under this interpretation, the authority to
arrest without warrant on reasonable suspicion was extended to misdemeanors, and there
no longer seemed to be the common-law requirement that the offense be committed in
the presence of the arresting officer. However, the Uniform Arrest Act, adopted in
Delaware in 1951, specifically provides that an arrest by a peace officer without a warrant
for a misdemeanor is lawful when he has reasonable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. It would seem that this
provision, being the latest ruling on the matter, must govern, and that there is some
doubt whether the interpretation placed on the act of 1863 by the court in the Rickards
case, can be applied to the almost identical statute of 1951, § 621.
There is of course the alternative interpretation that the construction given what
is now § 621 in the Rickards case and the plain words of the Uniform Arrest Act are
not in conflict. The act defines a lawful arrest. Section 621 merely provides that a person
making an arrest is guilty of a felony if he does not satisfy certain requirements, one
being that he must have probable cause to believe that the party he is arresting has
recently committed a crime. Perhaps a peace officer could make an unlawful arrest under
the Uniform Arrest Act, where he did not have probable cause to believe that a misde-
meanor had been committed in his presence, and still not be guilty of a felony under
§ 621 because it was made on reasonable ground to believe that the misdemeanor had
been committed, though not in his presence.
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1906(a) (1953).
82. If the requirement is that an offense in fact must be committed in the presence
of the arresting officer, the question arises as to whether a subsequent acquittal of the
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be construed technically or strictly, and that it is sufficient to justify an
arrest if the officer has knowledge that the offense was committed by reason
of the admissions of the accused before arrest.8 3
There is some question as to whether an arrest for a misdemeanor is
invalidated if the arresting officer fails to make the arrest immediately upon
seeing the offense committed. In Marshall v. Cleaver 4 the superior court,
after stating the common law rule, added that the arrest "must be made at the
time of the commission of the offense, or in the immediate pursuit of the
offender. '8 5 While this may have been the early rule in Delaware, it seems
to have been wholly repudiated by the recent case of State v. Holland.6 In
that case the defendant, without a license, sold beer to a police officer. The
officer delayed some fifteen minutes in arresting the defendant (without a
warrant) for the admitted purpose of seeking evidence of other possible
illegal activities on the premises. The court noted that Delaware statutory
law is silent on when the arrest must be made, and that since the state law
of arrest is now regulated by statute, whatever may have been the common
law rule or the rule in the Marshall case is no longer material. The court
found that the arrest satisfied the requirements of the Uniform Arrest Act
which is silent on the question of delay.
The Uniform Arrest Act relaxes the common law rule of arrest without
warrant for misdemeanors as applied by the Supreme Court. In United
States v. Carroll8 7 the Court declared that "an arrest for a misdemeanor
may not be made without a warrant unless the offense is committed in
the officer's presence. 8 8 Although the Delaware rule requires only reason-
able grounds it is doubtful that the extension is great enough to run into
constitutional difficulties under the fourth amendment. It is suggested that
in most jurisdictions the difference between the common law rule and the
Delaware rule may be one of phraseology rather than substance. At least
defendant on a misdemeanor charge establishes that his arrest was unlawful. This
inquiry was recently answered in the affirmative in People v. Dreares, 15 App. Div. 2d
204, 221 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1961), af'd, 11 N.Y.2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 812 (1962). The court
said the New York statute requires actual commission of the offense. But compare
Garske v. United States, 1 F.2d 620, (8th Cir. 1924). The Dreares court noted that
Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island have a more liberal rule under the Uni-
form Arrest Act and that other states have adopted this latter view through legislation
or judicial decision. Acquittal or conviction as the test of the legality of the arrest is
discussed in Note, 39 U. DEr. L.J. 595 (1962).
83. State v. Gulczynski 32 Del. (2 W. W. Harr.) 120, 120 Atl. 88 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1922).
84. 20 Del. (4 Penn.) 450, 56 Atd. 380 (1903).
85. Id. at 452, 56 Atl. at 381.
86. - Del. -, 189 A.2d 79 (Super. Ct. 1963).
87. 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
88. Id. at 164.
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one federal court decision has supported the validity of the Delaware law
on this point.8 9
An exception to the present rule under the Uniform Arrest Act is that
with respect to violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, 90 under which a large
proportion of arrests are made, Delaware has simply codified the common
law rule of arrest for misdemeanors. State troopers and other police officers
authorized to make arrests for violations of the motor vehicle and traffic laws
of the state may arrest upon view and without warrant any person violating
the Motor Vehicle Code."' Thus, the rules for arrest for motor vehicle viola-
tions may be somewhat more strict than for other misdemeanors.
"Upon view" of the arresting officer is apparently interpreted in much
the same way as "ih his presence." However, under the above mentioned
statute relating to violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, it appears that
in most cases the arresting officer must acutally see the offense, or one
of the acts constituting the offense, being committed.
92
It has been suggested that the law generally with respect to arrest for
misdemeanors is too rigid and if strictly adhered to would paralyze law
enforcement, particularly in the area of petty thefts.93 There is apparently
some feeling that the right on the part of the police to arrest without warrant
on reasonable suspicion should be extended to misdemeanors.9 4 Certainly the
Uniform Arrest Act moves far in that direction.
89. The district court in a footnote in United States v. Gaither, 209 F. Supp.
223, 224 n.2 (D. Del. 1962) said that the statute undoubtedly meets the standards of the
fourth amendment. This conclusion appears to be correct. See, e.g., Garske v. United
States, I F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1924).
90. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, §§ 101-6704 (1953).
91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1953).
92. In Rickards v. State, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950), the arrest of
defendant who was found sleeping in the woods half an hour after his car collided with
a truck was held to be illegal since Del. Rev. Code § 5683 (1935) (now DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 21, § 621) authorizes state police to arrest only upon view for violations of the
Motor Vehicle Code, and since in this case the arrest was not made upon view, but
upon the belief that a crime had been committed. A somewhat more liberal view appears
to have been taken in Halko v. State, - Del. -, 175 A.2d 42 (1961) where the court
stated :
We do not mean that a police officer may arrest solely on suspicion of violation
of the motor vehicle laws. But we do say that this arbitrary distinction between
felonies and misdemeanors justifies a liberal and reasonable interpretation of the
phrase "on view." When, as here, a police officer sees for himself a driver dead
drunk at the wheel of his car, under circumstances indicating the car has recently
been operated and he is assured by another driver that the man at the wheel had
actually been driving, we are of opinion that the arrest is made for a violation"on view" within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at -, 175 A.2d at 43.
93. Plowscowe, supra note 1, at 475.
94. Ibid. The author points out that there is some precedent for this change. See




Where a peace officer, without a warrant, arrests a person for a felony,
the arrest is lawful if the officer had reasonable grounds for believing that the
person he was arresting was guilty, whether or not the felony was actually
committed; and if the officer did not have reasonable grounds for believing
that the person he was arresting had committed the felony the arrest is still
lawful if the person was actually guilty. 5 If a lawful cause of arrest exists the
arrest is lawful, even though the officer charges the wrong offense or gives a
reason that does not justify the arrest.96 No formula can determine what
circumstances constitute reasonable grounds for arrest; reasonableness de-
pends on the facts of each case.
At common law it was the duty of peace officers to arrest without warrant
any person reasonably suspected of being a felon, or any person guilty of
committing a misdemeanor involving a breach of the peace in his presence or
within his view.97 The Delaware statutes have extended the common law
authority of peace officers to arrest and detain. The provisions authorizing
detention on suspicion and liberalizing the rules as to arrest without warrant
for misdemeanors already referred to are perhaps the most notable examples
of this extension. With respect to arrest for a felony, the common law rule
is extended by permitting an officer to arrest any person who has in fact
committed a felony, whether or not the officer had reason to believe he was
guilty. These provisions represent significant changes in the common law
rules of arrest. It should be noted that the rules announced here are not
in precise conformity with the standards adopted by the United States Su-
preme Court. When determining the lawfulness of an arrest this Court's
chief concern is whether there has been compliance with the fourth amend-
ment.98 The question is not one of reasonableness but of probable cause.99
The test may be whether at the time of the arrest there were grounds to
procure an arrest warrant from a judicial officer. 100 Whether or not there was
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1906(b) (1953).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1907 (1953).
97. State v. Gulczynski, 32 Del. (2 W. W. Harr.) 12, 120 Atl. 88 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1922).
98. The familiar language of this amendment is as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
99. E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), quoting from Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
100. Wong Sun v. United States, supra note 99, noted in 77 HARV. L. REV. 117
(1963). The Court announced this test for determining whether or not there was
probable cause: "The threshhold question in this case, therefore, is whether the officers
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probable cause for the arrest depends on the information available to the
arresting officers at the time the arrest was made.' 0' To impose this strict
probable cause requirement on the states would seem to invalidate that part
of the Delaware law which makes lawful an arrest without reasonable grounds
if the person arrested was actually guilty.
CONSEQUENCES OF AN UNLAWFUL ARREST
Under Delaware law it is a felony to procure or assist in an illegal
arrest-one for which no legal process was issued, or which was not made
to prevent a breach of the peace or the commission of some crime.10 2 No
reported case has been found where the penalties provided for in this statute
have been imposed. A party arrested unlawfully is virtually without remedy
except for a civil action for false arrest or false imprisonment.
An interesting question with regard to liability for false arrest arises
in connection with the special constable appointed by the governor at the
request of an individual, firm, or corporation doing business in the state.
The special constable has power to arrest, and questions sometimes arise
as to his status and the extent to which his employer is liable for false
arrests (or other wrongful acts) committed by him. There appears to be
some split of authority on the question of whether or not such individual is a
public officer or a private person. Although the appointment is made on the
application of an individual, firm, or corporation and the special constable
is paid by such party, he is generally held to be a public officer deriving his
authority directly from the state.103 No case on point has been reported in
could, on the information which impelled them to act, have procured a warrant for the
arrest of Toy." Id. at 480.
101. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). On determining probable cause
the court said:
The lawfulness of the arrest without warrant, in turn, must be based upon
probable cause, which exists "where 'the facts and circumstances within their
[the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed."
Id. at 34-35. Compare this with the test announced by the Court a few months earlier
in Wong Sun, supra note 100.
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 621 (1953). Since this is a criminal offense it would
appear that a specific intent would be required for conviction under the act, and that
mere misjudgment or negligence would be insufficient.
103. McKain v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 65 W. Va. 223, 64 S.E. 18 (1909). The
court said that a special officer appointed and commissioned by the governor at the
instance of a railroad company, even though paid by the company for his services, is
prima facie a public officer for whose wrongful acts the company is not liable, where
those acts are not instigated by it. In Hamlin v. Berks County, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 462 (1890)
a contrary view was taken under different facts. The court said that the railway police-
man involved was a private officer, a creature of the corporation and brought into
existence for its own private purposes, and was therefore not entitled to recover from
the county costs accruing in criminal prosecutions which if he could recover were a
duly elected constable. See Tucker v. Erie Ry., 69 N.J.L. 19, 54 Atl. 557 (Sup. Ct.
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Delaware. From cases decided in other jurisdictions the preferable view
would seem to be that such officers act sometimes as the servants of the
individual, firm, or corporation at whose instance they are appointed and
sometimes as officers of the state. There is considerable authority for this
proposition.
04
The import of these decisions is that such appointees, although paid
for all their services by the person at whose instance they are
appointed, are not servants of such persons in respect to all the
acts they perform by virtue of their offices; but only in respect to
services rendered the company such as defending or preserving its
property. The line of distinction, sometimes hard to recognize
under the circumstances of the particular case, marks the point at
which the act ceases to be one of service, and becomes one of
vindication of public right or justice, the apprehension or punish-
ment of a wrongdoer, not for the injury done to the employer, but
to the public at large.
10 5
Thus, the employer would be liable for a false arrest by a special constable
only where the offense involves his property, rights, or servants, or where
the false arrest was instigated by him. An arrest not -authorized by the
company or later ratified by it would be outside the scope of the constable's
employment. The broad grant of power given the special constable under
Delaware law would seem to indicate an intent on the part of the legis-
lature to make him prima facie a public officer. Some courts have presumed
that such an individual acts as a public officer and this presumption must
be overcome in order to hold the employer liable for the wrongful acts of his
special constable. 10 6
The Delaware Supreme Court has considered the effect of an unlawful
arrest upon the jurisdiction of the court. In State v. Moore'0° the defendant
1903) where the court stated that to render a company responsible for an unwarranted
arrest made by its special constable it is necessary to show that the arrest was instigated
by the company, its officers, or employes. The more recent Pennsylvania cases on the
subject have said that the provisions of the act, such as appointment by the governor
and the taking of an oath lead strongly to the conclusion that the policeman presumptively
acts as a public officer rather than as the servant or employee of the company. These
cases have held that where a policeman holds no other position with the company and
where the arrest was not directed or instigated by it the rule of respondeat superior
does not apply to make the company liable for an unlawful arrest for an offense against
the laws of the Commonwealth. See Finrock v. Northern Cent. Ry., 58 Pa. Super. 52
(1914).
104. See cases collected in McKain v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 65 W. Va. 233, 64
S.E. 18 (1909).
105. Id. at 236, 64 S.E. at 19-20.
106. In Fagan v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp., 299 Pa. 109 (1929) the court
stated: "There is no evidence to overcome the presumption that the act complained of
was done by the commissioned officers in their official capacity, and not as servants of
the coal company, and the latter cannot for that reason be held liable." Id. at 116.
107. 43 Del. (4 Terry) 509, 50 A.2d 791 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1946).
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challenged the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that she was not a
fugitive from Delaware and that she had been brought into the jurisdiction
forcibly by Delaware state troopers. The legal question was whether the
court, for purposes of determining its jurisdiction, would inquire into the
circumstances of the arrest of a defendant charged with a crime. The court
adopted the rule that such an inquiry will not be made.108 It refused to
recognize the distinction drawn by two states'0 between fugitives and non-
fugitives, saying there is no reason for the distinction and the rule applies
to both alike. Conceding that the rule adopted may in some instances lead
to injustice, the court was content to rely on the liability imposed by
federal and state laws to prevent illegal arrests: "Proper tribunals and
adequate laws exist for determining the responsibility and liability of those
whose, in mistaken zeal, may willfully or ignorantly exceed their authority in
making arrests."" 0 It is important to note that the decision here was limited
solely to the effect of the unlawful arrest on the jurisdiction of the court, and
did not concern admissibility of evidence or related problems.
The courts of the various jurisdictions were long divided regarding the
admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest or search and
seizure. The common law rule, which was at one time followed in most
jurisdictions, was that such evidence is admissible no matter how improperly
or illegally obtained."' Delaware cases followed this view prior to 1950,112
although the question had not reached the state supreme court. The policy
behind this view is that the benefit to society compensates for the injustice
suffered as a result by one individual. The question was presented to the
Delaware Supreme Court in Rickards v. State113 and a divided bench re-
versed the state's prior position. In that case the testimony relied upon to
convict the defendant was obtained solely as the result of an illegal arrest.
The court, overruling two prior Delaware decisions, 114 voluntarily adopted
108. The United States Supreme Court has reached the same result. See Frisbie
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) ; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). Both cases held
that where a person is unconstitutionally abducted from one state and transported to
another, he may still be tried in the latter state.
109. Kansas and Nebraska appear not to follow the general rule, although the cases
cited by defendant's Attorney were not absolutely clear on this point. In both cases the
defendants were fugitives and were seized in another state and brought back to the home
state unlawfully. The courts discharged the defendants saying in effect that public policy
should not tolerate breaches of the peace committed by its own officers in a sister state.
110. 43 Del. (4 Terry) 509, 516, 50 A.2d 791, 794.
111. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
112. State v. Episcopo, 37 Del. (7 W. W. Harr.) 439, 184 Atl. 872 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1936); State v. Chuchola, 32 Del. (2 W. W. Harr.) 133, 120 Atl. 212 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1922).
113. 45 Del. (6 Terry) 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950) noted in 120 OHio ST. L.J. 481
(1951).
114. State v. Episcopo, 37 Del. (7 W. W. Harr.) 439, 184 Atl. 872 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
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what has come to be known as the "Federal Rule" or the "exclusionary
rule," which is that "evidence obtained by a violation of constitutional
guarantees is inadmissible at the trial of the person whose guarantees have
been violated, if timely objection is made thereto. '115 This rule originated in
the United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States,116 which held
that the fourth amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an
illegal search and seizure in a federal prosecution. As the basis for its deci-
sion in Rickards the court stated:
We prefer the rule followed in the federal courts. We conceive it
the duty of the courts to protect constitutional guarantees. The most
effective way to protect the guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure and compulsory self-incriminaion is to exclude from
evidence any matter obtained by a violation of them."
7
As a result of this decision Delaware joined the growing minority of states
which had considered the question."18 After 1960 the states no longer had
the power to decide for themselves which rule to apply. In Mapp v. Ohio" 9
the Supreme Court held that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court.' 1 20 The exclusionary rule was given constitutional status under
the fourth amendment and was made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth. The recent case of Wong Sun v. United States'21 extended the
Mapp decision to cover unconstitutional arrests as well as searches. 122 This
did not require any change in Delaware law since the exclusionary rule had
already been adopted and in Rickards had been applied to evidence that had
been obtained as the result of an unlawful arrest.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
While a thorough discussion of search and seizure is beyond the scope
of inquiry here, the law in this area is so interwoven with the law of arrest
1936) ; State v. Chuchola, 32 Del. (2 W. W. Harr.) 133, 120 Atl. 212 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1922).
115. 45 Del. (6 Terry) 573, 585, 77 A.2d 199, 205 (1950).
116. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
117. 45 Del. (6 Terry) 573, 585, 77 A.2d 199, 205 (1950).
118. Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956). As of 1956, 25 states, England, and Canada
followed the so-called common law rule of admission, and generally without regard to a
pre-trial motion for suppression, while 21 states and the District of Columbia applied
the exclusionary rule.
119. 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
120. Id. at 655.
121. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
122. In addition to extending the exclusionary rule to unlawful arrests, the Court
excluded verbal evidence as well as physical evidence. Through the fourth amendment
the court barred the use of voluntary statements made during an illegal arrest. But see




that it cannot be entirely ignored. Delaware statutes provide that where the
arresting officer has no search warrant the evidence obtained must be the
product of a search incident to a lawful arrest,123 or a search made in hot
pursuit where there is probable cause to believe that the party pursued has
committed a felony, 24 or a search made with the consent of the owner or
party in possession of the premises to be searched. 125 The statute lists the
circumstances under which the search without a warrant incident to an arrest
may be made. 126 The arrest must be lawful and must be made on the premises
searched. Only premises, or that part of the premises, under the control of
the person to be arrested may be searched. The object sought must rep-
resent either the fruits of the crime, the means by which the crime was com-
mitted, or weapons or other things to be used for escape purposes. Finally,
the search without warrant must be necessary to prevent the escape or re-
moval of the person or thing to be searched for.
Not only must the above elements be satisfied to justify a search without
a warrant, but the searcher must have in mind some specific thing that he
is looking for. In United States v. Tate 27 defendant was stopped by a Dela-
ware state trooper for speeding and, after resisting the officer, was subdued
physically, handcuffed, and placed in the front seat of the police car. In
searching defendant's car the officer found a sawed-off shotgun. The defend-
ant was subsequently convicted of possession of the gun on which the federal
tax had not been paid. The federal district court held the search unreasonable
and unconstitutional since there was no indication of what the trooper was
looking for in his search. The shotgun was inadmissible and a motion for
acquittal was granted.
Another recent case, State v. DeKoenigswvarter,12 considered the type
of consent required to validate a search. Since there was no warrant or law-
ful arrest the sole question was whether the defendant had voluntarily con-
sented to the search of her car. The court invalidated the search on the
grounds of duress. While being held under illegal detention the defendant had
seen her companion beaten twice for passively resisting arrest on a minor
charge. Consent to a search is ineffective where tainted with duress or coer-
cion, even if that coercion is not practiced directly on the party whose con-
sent is sought.
As the court pointed out in a footnote in State v. Moore,'2 9 there is some
123. DE. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2303 (1953).
124. DEl.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2302 (1953).
125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2301 (1953).
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2303 (1953).
127. 209 F. Supp. 762 (D. Del. 1962).
128. - Del. -, 177 A.2d 344 (Super. Ct. 1962).
129. - Del. -, 187 A.2d 807 n.1 (Super. Ct. 1963).
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doubt as to the validity of the search of an automobile as incidental to an
arrest for a traffic violation. Halko v. State'80 upheld such a search in a case
arising out of an arrest for drunken driving, a statutory traffic violation. The
court in Moore suggests, however, that the result may be otherwise in the
case of less serious traffic violations. In another prosecution for operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated' 8' a blood sample was taken from the defend-
ant while he was in an unconscious state and before he had actually been
placed under arrest. From this sample a blood test was made and was sought
to be introduced into evidence at the trial to show the alcoholic content of
defendant's blood at the time he was found unconscious at the scene of the
automobile accident. Admissibility depended upon whether the evidence
was legally obtained. The court found the evidence inadmissible since there
was no consent and since the evidence was not obtained as the incident of a
lawful arrest. The court seemed reluctant to reach this decision and suggested
that the legislature might act to require that a licensed driver be deemed to
have consented to the taking of samples of blood for purposes of determining
its alcoholic content.
There seem to be no cases in Delaware which attempt the difficult task of
defining the limits to which a search without warrant incident to a lawful
arrest may go. The small number of Delaware cases is insufficient to illus-
trate the complexity of the problem. One of the leading United States Su-
preme Court cases concerning the permissible limits of search and seizure in-
cident to a lawful arrest is United States v. Rabinowitz.'5 2 In that case federal
officers with an arrest warrant but without a search warrant arrested respon-
dent in his place of business and searched his office. The search was upheld
as incident to the lawful arrest. "More broadly, Rabinowitz stands for the
proposition that a search warrant need not be obtained to validate a search of
the immediate premises incident to a lawful arrest with or without warrant
even though there is ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant."'' 8
Delaware may require more than this. A state statute provides that the
search must be necessary in order to prevent the escape or removal of the
person or thing searched. 8 4 While a number of decisions have expanded the
130. - Del. -, 175 A.2d 42 (1961).
131. State v. Wolf, 53 Del. (3 Storey) 88, 164 A.2d 865 (1960).
132. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
133. Broeder, Wong Sun-A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 497
(1963).
134. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2303 (1953). This provision was discussed in Lido
Social Club v. State, 46 Del. (7 Terry) 582, 86 A.2d 859 (Super. Ct. 1952). In that
case the facts presented a question as to whether time permitted the obtaining of a
search warrant. In upholding the search, the court pointed out that the result would
not be so clear if the State carried the burden of establishing that time did not permit
the obtaining of a search warrant, but that the statute imposed no such burden. The
court, citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) as being directly on point
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rule announced in Rabinowitz,3 5 others have limited it.'88 Considering the
growing influence of the advocates of civil rights on the Court, there may
be a swing back to Trupiano v. United States,137 a pre-Rabinowitz decision
which seems to hold that it is necessary to obtain a search warrant except in
limited emergency situations. On the other hand, in Ker v. California5 8 the
Supreme Court, citing Rabinowitz with apparent approval, said by way of
dictum that "[t]he practicability of obtaining a warrant is not the controlling
factor when a search is sought to be justified as incident to arrest. '139 Such
is the chaotic state of the law on the validity of the search without a warrant.
Delaware may require a stricter test for searches than Rabinowitz but
it does not require less. In State v. Moore140 the court stated that the search
and seizure provisions of both the State Constitution 141 and the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution protect parties against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and a violation of the latter is a violation of the former.
The cases up to this point have created no serious areas of conflict between
federal and Delaware law in the area of search and seizure. The question in
every case, state or federal, is whether the search was reasonable, and the
standard is the same at both levels; and, as the Supreme Court said in Rabi-
nowitz: "What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula . . . . The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches
must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case.' 14
2
CONCLUSION
The law of arrest by peace officers in Delaware is now largely the
subject of statutory regulation. To a considerable extent these regulations
are an affirmation of the common law rules, and to a lesser extent they are
an extension of these rules. In answer to the need for a workable law
of arrest to meet modern needs Delaware has adopted the Uniform Arrest
Act. While the language of the cases indicates a keen awareness of the
delicate balance that must be maintained between efficient law enforcement
on the one hand and protection of individual rights on the other, this factor
alone will not eliminate the possibility of a conflict arising between federal
and quoting extensively from it, seemed reluctant to impose on the parties conducting
the search any greater restrictions than those placed on federal officers.
135. See Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959).
136. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
137. 344 U.S. 699 (1948).
138. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
139. Id. at 41.
140. - Del. -, 187 A.2d 807 (1963).
141. Del. CONST. art. 1, § 6. This section is almost identical to the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.
142. 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950).
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and state law with respect to the standards to be applied in the areas of
arrest and search. The Supreme Court seems committed beyond recall to
a more active role in dictating to the states the permissible limits of such
activities. It is an inescapable conclusion that some of the provisions of the
Delaware law are not in complete harmony with the federal law and that
the Delaware law may have to give way where such conflicts arise. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court apparently has no intentions of pre-empting
the field, but is still willing to permit the states to conduct limited experimen-
tation to meet local problems of law enforcement. The Ker case brings out
this very point. Ker and Wong Sun illustrate the fact that the Supreme Court
is still undecided on many aspects of arrest and search and seizure, and
until the inconsistencies are settled it is difficult to predict the effect on the
states of these recent Supreme. Court pronouncements. In the meantime Dela-
ware is committed to the Uniform Arrest Act. Except for the detention
provision, there is a trend to grant more freedom to law enforcement officers
in the performance of their tasks-close cases generally seem to be resolved
in favor of the state. In the federal courts the emphasis is on protection of
individual rights. It remains to be seen how far the Delaware courts can
liberalize the requirements. for a lawful arrest without violating constitutional
rights.
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